轻量级的无线传感器网络选择性转发攻击检测

doi:10.3778/j.issn.1673-9418.2010073

计算机科学与探索 ›› 2022, Vol. 16 ›› Issue (4): 865-876.DOI: 10.3778/j.issn.1673-9418.2010073

轻量级的无线传感器网络选择性转发攻击检测

陈雪雁, 章志明⁺(), 杨伟, 李萍, 熊小勇

江西师范大学软件学院,南昌 330022

收稿日期:2020-09-28 修回日期:2020-11-30 出版日期:2022-04-01 发布日期:2020-12-08
通讯作者: + E-mail: zzm_9650@163.com
作者简介:陈雪雁（1997—）,女,江西南昌人,硕士研究生,主要研究方向为无线传感器网络安全。
章志明（1978—）,男,江西临川人,硕士,副教授,主要研究方向为无线传感器网络安全。
杨伟（1987—）,男,江西余干人,博士,讲师,主要研究方向为物联网和无线传感器网络安全。
李萍（1981—）,女,江西南昌人,硕士,讲师,主要研究方向为无线传感器网络安全。
熊小勇（1978—）,男,江西进贤人,硕士,讲师,主要研究方向为无线传感器网络安全。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金(62002143);江西省自然科学基金(20192BAB217007);江西省科技支撑计划(20161BBM26038)

Lightweight Selective Forwarding Attack Detection for Wireless Sensor Networks

CHEN Xueyan, ZHANG Zhiming⁺(), YANG Wei, LI Ping, XIONG Xiaoyong

School of Software, Jiangxi Normal University, Nanchang 330022, China

Received:2020-09-28 Revised:2020-11-30 Online:2022-04-01 Published:2020-12-08
About author:CHEN Xueyan, born in 1997, M.S. candidate. Her research interest is wireless sensor networks security.
ZHANG Zhiming, born in 1978, M.S., associate professor. His research interest is wireless sensor networks security.
YANG Wei, born in 1987, Ph.D., lecturer. His research interests include security in Internet of things and wireless sensor networks.
LI Ping, born in 1981, M.S., lecturer. Her resea-rch interest is wireless sensor networks security.
XIONG Xiaoyong, born in 1978, M.S., lectu-rer. His research interest is wireless sensor net-works security.
Supported by:
National Natural Science Foundation of China(62002143);Natural Science Foundation of Jiangxi Province(20192BAB217007);Science and Technology Support Program of Jiangxi Province(20161BBM26038)

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

为了抵抗无线传感器网络（WSNs）选择性转发攻击,提出一种轻量级的无线传感器网络选择性转发攻击检测方案（LSFAD）。LSFAD方案通过计算并比较路径的平均丢包率和路径的正常丢包率检测选择性转发攻击路径,通过计算每个节点的平均丢包率和正常丢包率检测定位恶意链路。LSFAD方案设计简单,不需要任何监听节点,不需要任何复杂的评估模型,且在正常的数据包收发过程中进行恶意路径的检测,不会影响整个网络的正常工作。安全和性能分析表明,LSFAD方案能抵抗恶意节点发起的被动选择性转发攻击和主动选择性转发攻击,LSFAD方案的通信开销要远远小于其他方案。实验仿真结果表明,LSFAD方案即使当链路的正常丢包率为0.125选择性转发攻击路径都能被检测到,当链路正常丢包率大于0.025,发起选择性转发攻击的恶意节点都能被成功检测定位到,并且网络在检测定位恶意节点的状态下消耗的能量与正常情况下消耗的能量相差不大。

关键词: 无线传感器网络（WSNs）, 选择性转发攻击, 恶意路径, 恶意节点

Abstract:

In order to resist selective forwarding attacks in wireless sensor networks (WSNs), a lightweight selective forwarding attack detection scheme for wireless sensor networks (LSFAD) is presented. The LSFAD scheme detects the selective forwarding attack path by calculating and comparing the average packet loss rate of the path and the normal packet loss rate of the path, and locates malicious nodes or malicious links by calculating the average packet loss rate and normal packet loss rate of each node. The design of the LSFAD scheme is simple, it doesn’t require any monitoring nodes and any complex evaluation models, and malicious path detection is performed during the normal process of sending and receiving packets, which doesn’t affect the normal work of the whole network. Security and performance analysis show that the LSFAD scheme can resist passive selective forwarding attacks and active selective forwarding attacks, and the communication cost of the LSFAD scheme is much less than other schemes. Experimental simulation results show that in the LSFAD scheme, the selective forwarding attack path can be detected even if the normal packet loss rate of the link is 0.125, and when the normal packet loss rate of the link is greater than 0.025, malicious nodes or malicious links can be successfully detected and located by the base station. More-over, the energy consumed by detecting and locating malicious nodes is similar to that consumed in normal model.

Key words: wireless sensor networks (WSNs), selective forwarding attack, malicious path, malicious nodes

中图分类号:

TP393

陈雪雁, 章志明, 杨伟, 李萍, 熊小勇. 轻量级的无线传感器网络选择性转发攻击检测[J]. 计算机科学与探索, 2022, 16(4): 865-876.

CHEN Xueyan, ZHANG Zhiming, YANG Wei, LI Ping, XIONG Xiaoyong. Lightweight Selective Forwarding Attack Detection for Wireless Sensor Networks[J]. Journal of Frontiers of Computer Science and Technology, 2022, 16(4): 865-876.

图/表 11

表1 符号定义表

Table 1 Notation definition table

符号	含义
BS	基站
$P$	数据包
DFT	数据包源节点转发表
$I D i$	节点 $i$ 的唯一身份标记
$ForWard_Coun t i$	中间节点转发源节点 $i$ 发送的数据包个数
$PathID_Arra y i$	存储源节点 $i$ 到基站所经过的中间节点身份标记的数组
$Sum_Coun t i$	基站收到源节点 $i$ 发送的数据包个数
$Drop_Coun t i$	源节点 $i$ 发送给基站丢失的数据包个数
$Seq_Numbe r i$	数据包序列号,作为数据包的唯一标识
$D P average$	路径平均丢包率
$D P normal$	路径正常丢包率
$D N average$	节点平均丢包率
$D N normal$	节点正常丢包率
$K i, BS$	节点 $i$ 与基站BS共享的对称密钥
$E K i, BS (M)$	用 $K i, BS$ 对消息 $M$ 进行加密
$D K i, BS (M)$	用 $K i, BS$ 对消息 $M$ 进行解密
$Timestamp$	时间戳

表1 符号定义表

Table 1 Notation definition table

符号	含义
BS	基站
$P$	数据包
DFT	数据包源节点转发表
$I D i$	节点 $i$ 的唯一身份标记
$ForWard_Coun t i$	中间节点转发源节点 $i$ 发送的数据包个数
$PathID_Arra y i$	存储源节点 $i$ 到基站所经过的中间节点身份标记的数组
$Sum_Coun t i$	基站收到源节点 $i$ 发送的数据包个数
$Drop_Coun t i$	源节点 $i$ 发送给基站丢失的数据包个数
$Seq_Numbe r i$	数据包序列号,作为数据包的唯一标识
$D P average$	路径平均丢包率
$D P normal$	路径正常丢包率
$D N average$	节点平均丢包率
$D N normal$	节点正常丢包率
$K i, BS$	节点 $i$ 与基站BS共享的对称密钥
$E K i, BS (M)$	用 $K i, BS$ 对消息 $M$ 进行加密
$D K i, BS (M)$	用 $K i, BS$ 对消息 $M$ 进行解密
$Timestamp$	时间戳

表2 数据包转发表

Table 2 Data forward table

Source_ID	ForWord_Count
...	...
$I D i$	$ForWard_Coun t i$
...	...

表2 数据包转发表

Table 2 Data forward table

Source_ID	ForWord_Count
...	...
$I D i$	$ForWard_Coun t i$
...	...

表3 数据包发送表

Table 3 Data send table

Source_ID	Path_Array	Seq_Number	Sum_Count	Drop_Count
...	...	...	...	...
$I D i$	$PathID_Arra y i$	$Seq_Numbe r i$	$Sum_Coun t i$	$Drop_Coun t i$
...	...	...	...	...

表3 数据包发送表

Table 3 Data send table

Source_ID	Path_Array	Seq_Number	Sum_Count	Drop_Count
...	...	...	...	...
$I D i$	$PathID_Arra y i$	$Seq_Numbe r i$	$Sum_Coun t i$	$Drop_Coun t i$
...	...	...	...	...

表4 通信开销比较

Table 4 Comparison of communication overhead

CLAIDS	DSFLACQ	PHACK	LSFAD
$2 M × N$	$(M + 1) × N$	$2 M$	$M + 1$

表4 通信开销比较

Table 4 Comparison of communication overhead

CLAIDS	DSFLACQ	PHACK	LSFAD
$2 M × N$	$(M + 1) × N$	$2 M$	$M + 1$

表5 存储开销比较

Table 5 Comparison of storage overhead

CLAIDS	DSFLACQ	LSFAD
$16 N$	$(20 + 4 M) × N$	$4 × (W - 1)$

表5 存储开销比较

Table 5 Comparison of storage overhead

CLAIDS	DSFLACQ	LSFAD
$16 N$	$(20 + 4 M) × N$	$4 × (W - 1)$

表6 实验仿真参数

Table 6 Experimental simulation parameters

参数	值或范围
网络部署区域/m²	500×500
网络中节点数量	100
节点的通信半径/m	90
节点的初始能量/J	1
发送和接收能耗/(nJ/bit)	50
数据包发送时间间隔/s	1
恶意节点数量	20
恶意节点丢包概率	0.2~0.8
链路正常丢包概率	0.005~0.125
仿真时间/s	600

图1 只有一个恶意节点的路径正常和平均丢包率

Fig.1 Normal packet loss rate and average packet loss rate of path with only one malicious node

图2 有多个恶意节点的路径正常和平均丢包率

Fig.2 Normal packet loss rate and average packet loss rate of path with multiple malicious nodes

图3 不同路径长度下的路径正常和平均丢包率

Fig.3 Normal packet loss rate and average packet loss rate of path with different path lengths

图4 成功定位到恶意节点的概率

Fig.4 Probability of successfully locating malicious node

图5 正常模式和检测模式下的能量消耗

Fig.5 Energy consumption in normal mode and detection mode

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轻量级的无线传感器网络选择性转发攻击检测

Lightweight Selective Forwarding Attack Detection for Wireless Sensor Networks

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