关键词: 车联网（VANET）, 博弈论, 信誉权限, 信用度

Abstract: For saving their own network sources, selfish nodes in VANET (vehicular ad hoc network) will refuse to forward packets received from other nodes, which will reduce network throughput. To solve this problem, people usually add reputation-based or pricing-based incentives making nodes cooperate. Based on the punishment to selfish nodes using reputation mechanism, this paper proposes a dual-incentive mechanism by paying credits to cooperative nodes as reward. This paper also gives a reputation rebuilding model to improve and perfect the punishing mechanism, and then analyzes the behavior of nodes in a single data packet forwarding game from the economic perspective. The results of the theoretical analysis demonstrate that the proposed mechanism is efficient in promoting cooperation while improving the network throughput. The experimental results show that the proposed mechanism makes the packet-loss rate converge quickly, and the vehicle nodes exhibit extremely high forwarding rate.

Key words: vehicular ad hoc network (VANET), game theory, reputation permissions, credit