Competition Strategy of Online Retailers Considering Service Sensitivity and Cognitive Differences

doi:10.3778/j.issn.1673-9418.2103110

Journal of Frontiers of Computer Science and Technology ›› 2022, Vol. 16 ›› Issue (9): 2096-2107.DOI: 10.3778/j.issn.1673-9418.2103110

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Competition Strategy of Online Retailers Considering Service Sensitivity and Cognitive Differences

ZHOU Xiaoxiang¹^,⁺(), HUANG Chengfeng², LI Hao¹^,²

1. School of Economics and Management, Chongqing Jiaotong University, Chongqing 400074, China
2. Western China Transportation-Economy-Society Development Study Center, Chongqing Jiaotong University, Chongqing 400074, China

Received:2021-03-04 Revised:2021-05-10 Online:2022-09-01 Published:2021-05-19
About author:ZHOU Xiaoxiang, born in 1986, Ph.D. candidate. His research interests include commercial economy, decision optimization, risk management, etc.
HUANG Chengfeng, born in 1965, Ph.D., professor, Ph.D. supervisor. His research interests include traffic economics, decision optimization, traffic development strategy, etc.
LI Hao, born in 1982, Ph.D., professor. His research interests include revenue management, traffic economics, decision optimization, etc.
Supported by:
National Natural Science Foundation of China(71402012);Humanity and Social Science Foundation of Chongqing Municipal Education Commission(22SKGH183)

考虑服务和认知差异的网络零售商竞争策略

周小祥¹^,⁺(), 黄承锋², 李豪¹^,²

1.重庆交通大学经济与管理学院,重庆 400074
2.重庆交通大学西部交通与经济社会发展研究中心,重庆 400074

通讯作者: + E-mail: zhouxxjs@126.com
作者简介:周小祥（1986—）,男,重庆忠县人,博士研究生,主要研究方向为流通经济、决策优化、风险管理等。
黄承锋（1965—）,男,四川开江人,博士,教授,博士生导师,主要研究方向为交通经济、决策优化、交通发展战略研究等。
李豪（1982—）,男,四川乐山人,博士,教授,主要研究方向为收益管理、运输经济研究、决策优化等。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金(71402012);重庆市教委人文社会科学研究项目(22SKGH183)

Abstract

Abstract:

In order to analyze the competitive behavior of online retailers in complex market under the environment of diversified customers, a duopoly competition model considering the service sensitivity and cognitive differences is established by using the Hotelling model. The equilibrium price, demand and revenue of static game and dynamic game are solved, and the changing trend is studied by numerical simulation. Results have shown that online retailers' profits are affected by the service sensitivity and cognitive differences, not only related to the price directly, but also relevant to unit service cost, brand cognition and competitors' pricing strategy highly. The high service providers with internet brand cognition have a significant price advantage, which means high service is always accompanied by high prices. Stray price effects exist in online retailers, blind to improve the quality of the cognitive service may do more harm than good for the low quality of service provider. Online retailers have the first-mover advantages. The previous decision maker's equilibrium profit is obviously higher than the latter, as well as the price. The dynamic equilibrium is also significantly better than the static equilibrium on profits and price. Online retailers have sufficient intrinsic motivation to grab the opportunity. There is a theoretical threshold for the service level of online retail, and merchants will not provide services beyond the threshold. Theoretical references can be provided on the pricing competition and service mode selection for online retailers in the context of big data.

Key words: online retailers, service sensitivity, cognitive differences, competition strategy

摘要：

为分析顾客多元化环境下网络零售商复杂市场竞争行为,利用Hotelling模型,引入服务敏感度、认知差异化建立了零售商网上销售双寡头竞争模型,求解静态博弈和动态博弈下的均衡价格、需求及收益,并通过数值仿真研究变化趋势。研究表明,网络零售商的利润受到认知差异和服务差异的共同影响,不仅与价格直接相关,还与单位服务成本、品牌认知度、竞争对手的价格策略高度相关。具有网络品牌认知的高服务提供商具有显著的价格优势,高服务总是伴随着高价格。网络零售商存在认知离散价格效应,低认知服务提供商盲目提升认知服务水平有可能得不偿失。网络零售商同时具有博弈的动态决策优势,先决策的一方在利润、价格上明显优于后决策的一方,也显著优于静态决策下的均衡,零售商有充分的动力抢占市场先机。网络零售的服务水平存在一个理论阈值,商家不会提供超过阈值的服务,该研究结论可为大数据背景下零售商网络竞争均衡定价决策和服务模式选择提供理论参考。

关键词: 网络零售商, 服务敏感度, 认知差异, 竞争策略

CLC Number:

ZHOU Xiaoxiang, HUANG Chengfeng, LI Hao. Competition Strategy of Online Retailers Considering Service Sensitivity and Cognitive Differences[J]. Journal of Frontiers of Computer Science and Technology, 2022, 16(9): 2096-2107.

周小祥, 黄承锋, 李豪. 考虑服务和认知差异的网络零售商竞争策略[J]. 计算机科学与探索, 2022, 16(9): 2096-2107.

Figures/Tables 19

Fig.1 Customer distribution based on service differentiation

Fig.2 Customer distribution based on cognition differentiation

Table 1 Main variables and parameters

变量名	参数意义	变量名	参数意义
$θ$	服务敏感度	$α$	单位服务成本
$ρ$	品牌认知敏感度	$β$	单位品牌认知成本
$S i$	网络零售商服务水平	$[θ -, θ_]$	顾客服务偏好空间
$R i$	网络零售商品牌认知水平	$[ρ -, ρ_]$	顾客服务品牌认知偏好空间
$F (S i)$	提供单位产品服务水平的成本	$φ$	两个网络零售商服务差异和品牌认知差异比率
$G (R i)$	网络零售商获得单位品牌认知的成本	$P i$	网络零售商的价格
$Π i$	网络零售商利润	$D i$	网络零售商的需求

Table 1 Main variables and parameters

变量名	参数意义	变量名	参数意义
$θ$	服务敏感度	$α$	单位服务成本
$ρ$	品牌认知敏感度	$β$	单位品牌认知成本
$S i$	网络零售商服务水平	$[θ -, θ_]$	顾客服务偏好空间
$R i$	网络零售商品牌认知水平	$[ρ -, ρ_]$	顾客服务品牌认知偏好空间
$F (S i)$	提供单位产品服务水平的成本	$φ$	两个网络零售商服务差异和品牌认知差异比率
$G (R i)$	网络零售商获得单位品牌认知的成本	$P i$	网络零售商的价格
$Π i$	网络零售商利润	$D i$	网络零售商的需求

Table 2 Online retailers' equilibrium under different services

取值	类别	网络零售商1	网络零售商2
$φ > 0$	价格	$α S 1 + 16 (R 1 - R 2) [(ρ - + ρ_) + 2 φ (2 θ - - θ_- α)]$	$α S 2 + 16 (R 1 - R 2) [- (ρ - + ρ_) + 2 φ (θ - - 2 θ_+ α)]$
	需求	$ρ - - ρ_8 ρ - + ρ_φ + 2 (2 θ - - θ_+ α)$	$ρ - - ρ_8 - ρ - + ρ_φ - 2 (2 θ - - 3 θ_+ α)$
	利润	$(R 1 - R 2) (ρ - - ρ_) 36 φ [(ρ - + ρ_) + 2 φ (2 θ - - θ_- α)] 2 - β R 12$	$(R 1 - R 2) (ρ - - ρ_) 36 φ [(ρ - + ρ_) - 2 φ (θ - - 2 θ_+ α)] 2 - β R 22$
$φ < 0$	价格	$α S 1 + 16 (R 1 - R 2) [(ρ - + ρ_) + 2 φ (2 θ - - θ_- α)]$	$α S 2 + 16 (R 1 - R 2) [- (ρ - + ρ_) + 2 φ (θ - - 2 θ_+ α)]$
	需求	$ρ - - ρ_6 - ρ - + ρ_φ + 2 (θ - - 2 θ_+ α)$	$ρ - - ρ_6 ρ - + ρ_φ + 2 (2 θ - - θ_- α)$
	利润	$- (R 1 - R 2) (ρ - - ρ_) 36 φ [(ρ - + ρ_) - 2 φ (θ - - 2 θ_+ α)] 2 - β R 12$	$- (R 1 - R 2) (ρ - - ρ_) 36 φ [(ρ - + ρ_) + 2 φ (2 θ - - θ_- α)] 2 - β R 22$

Table 2 Online retailers' equilibrium under different services

取值	类别	网络零售商1	网络零售商2
$φ > 0$	价格	$α S 1 + 16 (R 1 - R 2) [(ρ - + ρ_) + 2 φ (2 θ - - θ_- α)]$	$α S 2 + 16 (R 1 - R 2) [- (ρ - + ρ_) + 2 φ (θ - - 2 θ_+ α)]$
	需求	$ρ - - ρ_8 ρ - + ρ_φ + 2 (2 θ - - θ_+ α)$	$ρ - - ρ_8 - ρ - + ρ_φ - 2 (2 θ - - 3 θ_+ α)$
	利润	$(R 1 - R 2) (ρ - - ρ_) 36 φ [(ρ - + ρ_) + 2 φ (2 θ - - θ_- α)] 2 - β R 12$	$(R 1 - R 2) (ρ - - ρ_) 36 φ [(ρ - + ρ_) - 2 φ (θ - - 2 θ_+ α)] 2 - β R 22$
$φ < 0$	价格	$α S 1 + 16 (R 1 - R 2) [(ρ - + ρ_) + 2 φ (2 θ - - θ_- α)]$	$α S 2 + 16 (R 1 - R 2) [- (ρ - + ρ_) + 2 φ (θ - - 2 θ_+ α)]$
	需求	$ρ - - ρ_6 - ρ - + ρ_φ + 2 (θ - - 2 θ_+ α)$	$ρ - - ρ_6 ρ - + ρ_φ + 2 (2 θ - - θ_- α)$
	利润	$- (R 1 - R 2) (ρ - - ρ_) 36 φ [(ρ - + ρ_) - 2 φ (θ - - 2 θ_+ α)] 2 - β R 12$	$- (R 1 - R 2) (ρ - - ρ_) 36 φ [(ρ - + ρ_) + 2 φ (2 θ - - θ_- α)] 2 - β R 22$

Table 3 Online retailers' equilibrium under different cognition

类别	网络零售商1	网络零售商2
价格	$α S 1 + 16 (R 1 - R 2) [2 (2 ρ - - ρ_) + φ (θ - + θ_- 2 α)]$	$α S 2 + 16 (R 1 - R 2) [2 (ρ - - 2 ρ_) + φ (2 α - θ - - θ_)]$
需求	$ρ - - ρ_6 [(ρ - - 2 ρ_) + φ (θ - + θ_- 2 α)]$	$ρ - - ρ_6 [(5 ρ - - 4 ρ_) - φ (θ - + θ_- 2 α)]$
利润	$(R 1 - R 2) (θ - - θ_) 36 [2 (2 ρ - - ρ_) + φ (θ - + θ_- 2 α)] × [(ρ - - 2 ρ_) + φ (θ - + θ_- 2 α)] - β R 12$	$(R 1 - R 2) (θ - - θ_) 36 [2 (ρ - - 2 ρ_) + φ (θ - + θ_- 2 α)] × [(5 ρ - - 4 ρ_) - φ (θ - + θ_- 2 α)] - β R 22$

Table 3 Online retailers' equilibrium under different cognition

类别	网络零售商1	网络零售商2
价格	$α S 1 + 16 (R 1 - R 2) [2 (2 ρ - - ρ_) + φ (θ - + θ_- 2 α)]$	$α S 2 + 16 (R 1 - R 2) [2 (ρ - - 2 ρ_) + φ (2 α - θ - - θ_)]$
需求	$ρ - - ρ_6 [(ρ - - 2 ρ_) + φ (θ - + θ_- 2 α)]$	$ρ - - ρ_6 [(5 ρ - - 4 ρ_) - φ (θ - + θ_- 2 α)]$
利润	$(R 1 - R 2) (θ - - θ_) 36 [2 (2 ρ - - ρ_) + φ (θ - + θ_- 2 α)] × [(ρ - - 2 ρ_) + φ (θ - + θ_- 2 α)] - β R 12$	$(R 1 - R 2) (θ - - θ_) 36 [2 (ρ - - 2 ρ_) + φ (θ - + θ_- 2 α)] × [(5 ρ - - 4 ρ_) - φ (θ - + θ_- 2 α)] - β R 22$

Table 4 Online retailers' dynamic equilibrium under different services

取值	类别	网络零售商1	网络零售商2
$φ > 0$	价格	$α S 1 + 14 (R 1 - R 2) [2 φ (2 θ - - θ_- α) + (ρ - + ρ_)]$	$α S 2 + 18 (R 1 - R 2) [2 φ (2 θ - - 3 θ_+ α) - (ρ - + ρ_)]$
	需求	$ρ - - ρ_8 - ρ - + ρ_φ + 2 (θ - + 2 θ_- α)$	$ρ - - ρ_8 ρ - + ρ_φ + 2 (3 θ - - 6 θ_+ α)$
	利润	$(R 1 - R 2) (ρ - - ρ_) 32 φ [(ρ - + ρ_) + 2 φ (2 θ - - θ_- α)] 2 - β R 12$	$(R 1 - R 2) (ρ - - ρ_) 64 φ [- (ρ - + ρ_) - 2 φ (2 θ - - 3 θ_+ α)] 2 - β R 22$
$φ < 0$	价格	$α S 1 + 14 (R 1 - R 2) [2 φ (θ - - 2 θ_- α) + 3 (ρ - + ρ_)]$	$α S 2 + 18 (R 1 - R 2) [2 φ (α - θ - - 2 θ_) + (ρ - + ρ_)]$
	需求	$ρ - - ρ_8 ρ - + ρ_φ + 2 (3 θ - - 6 θ_+ α)$	$ρ - - ρ_8 - ρ - + ρ_φ + 2 (θ - + 2 θ_- α)$
	利润	$(R 1 - R 2) (ρ - - ρ_) 32 φ [3 (ρ - + ρ_) + 2 φ (θ_- 2 θ - - α)] 2 - β R 12$	$- (R 1 - R 2) (ρ - - ρ_) 64 φ [(ρ - + ρ_) - 2 φ (θ - + 2 θ_- α)] 2 - β R 22$

Table 4 Online retailers' dynamic equilibrium under different services

取值	类别	网络零售商1	网络零售商2
$φ > 0$	价格	$α S 1 + 14 (R 1 - R 2) [2 φ (2 θ - - θ_- α) + (ρ - + ρ_)]$	$α S 2 + 18 (R 1 - R 2) [2 φ (2 θ - - 3 θ_+ α) - (ρ - + ρ_)]$
	需求	$ρ - - ρ_8 - ρ - + ρ_φ + 2 (θ - + 2 θ_- α)$	$ρ - - ρ_8 ρ - + ρ_φ + 2 (3 θ - - 6 θ_+ α)$
	利润	$(R 1 - R 2) (ρ - - ρ_) 32 φ [(ρ - + ρ_) + 2 φ (2 θ - - θ_- α)] 2 - β R 12$	$(R 1 - R 2) (ρ - - ρ_) 64 φ [- (ρ - + ρ_) - 2 φ (2 θ - - 3 θ_+ α)] 2 - β R 22$
$φ < 0$	价格	$α S 1 + 14 (R 1 - R 2) [2 φ (θ - - 2 θ_- α) + 3 (ρ - + ρ_)]$	$α S 2 + 18 (R 1 - R 2) [2 φ (α - θ - - 2 θ_) + (ρ - + ρ_)]$
	需求	$ρ - - ρ_8 ρ - + ρ_φ + 2 (3 θ - - 6 θ_+ α)$	$ρ - - ρ_8 - ρ - + ρ_φ + 2 (θ - + 2 θ_- α)$
	利润	$(R 1 - R 2) (ρ - - ρ_) 32 φ [3 (ρ - + ρ_) + 2 φ (θ_- 2 θ - - α)] 2 - β R 12$	$- (R 1 - R 2) (ρ - - ρ_) 64 φ [(ρ - + ρ_) - 2 φ (θ - + 2 θ_- α)] 2 - β R 22$

Table 5 Online retailers' dynamic equilibrium under different cognition

取值	类别	网络零售商1	网络零售商2
$φ > 0$	价格	$α S 1 + 14 (R 1 - R 2) [2 (2 ρ - - ρ_) + φ (θ - + θ_- 2 α)]$	$α S 2 + 18 (R 1 - R 2) [2 (2 ρ - - 3 ρ_) + (2 α - θ - - θ_) φ]$
	需求	$θ - - θ_8 [2 (2 ρ - - ρ_) + φ (θ - + θ_- 2 α)]$	$θ - - θ_8 [(4 ρ - - 6 ρ_) - φ (θ - + θ_- 2 α)]$
	利润	$(R 1 - R 2) (θ - - θ_) 32 [2 (2 ρ - - ρ_) + φ (θ - + θ_- 2 α)] 2 - β R 12$	$(R 1 - R 2) (θ - - θ_) 64 [2 (2 ρ - - 3 ρ_) - φ (θ - + θ_- 2 α)] 2 - β R 22$

Table 5 Online retailers' dynamic equilibrium under different cognition

取值	类别	网络零售商1	网络零售商2
$φ > 0$	价格	$α S 1 + 14 (R 1 - R 2) [2 (2 ρ - - ρ_) + φ (θ - + θ_- 2 α)]$	$α S 2 + 18 (R 1 - R 2) [2 (2 ρ - - 3 ρ_) + (2 α - θ - - θ_) φ]$
	需求	$θ - - θ_8 [2 (2 ρ - - ρ_) + φ (θ - + θ_- 2 α)]$	$θ - - θ_8 [(4 ρ - - 6 ρ_) - φ (θ - + θ_- 2 α)]$
	利润	$(R 1 - R 2) (θ - - θ_) 32 [2 (2 ρ - - ρ_) + φ (θ - + θ_- 2 α)] 2 - β R 12$	$(R 1 - R 2) (θ - - θ_) 64 [2 (2 ρ - - 3 ρ_) - φ (θ - + θ_- 2 α)] 2 - β R 22$

Fig.3 Price changes under different services

Fig.4 Price changes under different cognition

Fig.5 Demand changes under different services

Fig.6 Demand changes under different cognition

Fig.7 Profit changes under different services

Fig.8 Profit changes under different cognition

Fig.9 Price changes under different services and games

Fig.10 Price changes under different cognition and games

Fig.11 Demand changes under different services and games

Fig.12 Demand changes under different cognition and games

Fig.13 Profit changes under different services and games

Fig.14 Profit changes under different cognition and games

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Competition Strategy of Online Retailers Considering Service Sensitivity and Cognitive Differences

考虑服务和认知差异的网络零售商竞争策略

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