Abstract: For saving their own network sources, selfish nodes in VANET (vehicular ad hoc network) will refuse to forward packets received from other nodes, which will reduce network throughput. To solve this problem, people usually add reputation-based or pricing-based incentives making nodes cooperate. Based on the punishment to selfish nodes using reputation mechanism, this paper proposes a dual-incentive mechanism by paying credits to cooperative nodes as reward. This paper also gives a reputation rebuilding model to improve and perfect the punishing mechanism, and then analyzes the behavior of nodes in a single data packet forwarding game from the economic perspective. The results of the theoretical analysis demonstrate that the proposed mechanism is efficient in promoting cooperation while improving the network throughput. The experimental results show that the proposed mechanism makes the packet-loss rate converge quickly, and the vehicle nodes exhibit extremely high forwarding rate.

Key words: vehicular ad hoc network (VANET), game theory, reputation permissions, credit

摘要： 车联网中自私节点为节省自身能源消耗倾向于拒绝为其他节点转发数据包，为克服这种降低网络整体性能的自私性，常采用基于信誉权限和价格的激励机制来促进合作。在以信誉权限机制处罚自私行为的基础上，提出了对协作节点给予信用度奖励的双重激励机制。在该机制中，设置了信誉重建模型以完善基于信誉的惩罚机制，并基于单跳博弈模型对节点行为进行经济学分析。最后对提出的双重激励机制进行了理论分析，该激励机制在保证节点协作的同时提高了网络吞吐量。仿真实验表明，所提机制在大规模情形下可使得网络具有快速收敛的丢包率和极高的节点转发率。

关键词: 车联网（VANET）, 博弈论, 信誉权限, 信用度